Research on Adoption Strategies of Social E-commerce Recommendation Systems in Dual-Channel Supply Chains
Jingpei Ma, Yaoxin Lv*, Zemin Luo, Yan Su and Zhen Yang
ABSTRACT
In the context of the rapid rise of social e-commerce, this paper constructs a game-theoretic model for a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and an online retailer. It investigates the manufacturer's strategy for adopting a third-party recommendation system in its direct sales channel. The model innovatively introduces two core variables—social interaction effect intensity and social channel commission rate—to systematically analyze the manufacturer's adoption decisions and the game equilibrium among supply chain members under different payment schemes (Cost-Per-Sale CPS and Cost-Per-Click CPC). By solving a three-stage Stackelberg game across seven scenarios, this study finds that when the retailer has already adopted a recommendation system, the manufacturer's dominant strategy is to forgo adoption and "free-ride." When the retailer does not adopt, the manufacturer's decision depends on the recommendation strength and cost. The social interaction effect amplifies the impact of recommendation strength, thereby increasing the manufacturer's willingness to adopt, while the social channel commission rate increases the cost burden, suppressing adoption willingness. Furthermore, the manufacturer's preference between CPS and CPC shifts dynamically with the adoption context and recommendation cost. The study also clarifies the decision boundaries for achieving a win-win outcome for both the manufacturer and retailer. The conclusions provide a theoretical basis and managerial insights for enterprises formulating recommendation system adoption strategies and channel coordination mechanisms in the social e-commerce environment.
