Comparative Governance Effectiveness Across Constitutional Systems An Analysis of Parliamentary, Presidential, Semi-Presidential, and Hybrid Models (UK, USA, France, and India)
Sangamithrai V
ABSTRACT
This study examines governance effectiveness across four constitutional systems: parliamentary (United Kingdom), presidential (United States), semipresidential (France), and hybrid (India). Using a qualitative comparative case study approach based on secondary data, the research analyzes how institutional design influences governance outcomes such as stability, accountability, flexibility, and policy efficiency. The study finds that presidential systems provide stable governance through fixed executive tenure but may experience policy deadlock, whereas parliamentary systems enhance accountability and adaptability despite the possibility of executive instability. Semi-presidential systems offer a balance between executive authority and legislative responsiveness but can face institutional conflict during periods of cohabitation. India’s hybrid constitutional model demonstrates adaptability and resilience within a diverse sociopolitical environment. The study concludes that governance effectiveness is shaped not only by constitutional design but also by political culture, historical context, and institutional flexibility. The study contributes to comparative governance literature through a multi-system analytical framework.
