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Review Article

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The Conflict Between Social and Economic Efficiency, Traditional Values and the Welfare of the People

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ABSTRACT

Today, the success of a country's socio-economic development is generally determined by economic indicators -GDP per capita, the economic efficiency of production, and so on. The author of the article considers this approach to be clearly inadequate in a context where private ownership predominates, and uses examples of privatisation to demonstrate the negative impact of economic efficiency on the social development of society. To ensure the harmonious development of all sections of society, the article proposes that, alongside an analysis of the country's economic situation, an analysis of its social development should also be carried out, so that progress can be assessed not only in terms of corporate profitability but also in terms of the consequences for all the country's citizens. At the same time, assessments of social development indicators must be based on the fundamental traditional values of the people and take these into account in the relevant indices.

Keywords: Civilisation, Traditional Values, Mentality, Economic Efficiency, Market Reforms, Privatisation, Social Efficiency, the Public Interest, Social Justice, the Welfare of the People

Introduction

The Russian Federation is a social state whose policy is aimed at creating conditions that ensure a "worthy life and a free development" of every citizen (Constitution of the Russian Federation, Chapter 1, Article 7). The well-being of the citizens of the Russian Federation depends not only on the sale of the country's natural resources, but primarily on the successful functioning of its diversified, intricately structured national economy, which is spread across a vast territory encompassing almost all known climatic zones. Therefore, for the national economy to succeed and effectively meet the challenge of continuously improving public welfare at a modern standard, it must align with the current state of global scientific, engineering, and technological development.

Traditionally, the success of a country's economic development is considered to be quite accurately determined by indicators of economic efficiency (EE). Overall, EE is a complex, multifaceted category encompassing a range of subsystems, from the efficiency of capital investments to the efficiency of remuneration systems. In simplified terms, EE represents the ratio between the achieved output and the resource inputs required to obtain it. These resources include finances, production facilities, raw materials, supplies, energy, buildings, structures, equipment, and so forth. However, the most critical resource-without which economic activity is fundamentally impossible-is labor (human resources). Labor resources represent that segment of the population which provides the entire nation with all necessary goods and services. Simultaneously, these workers, along with their families, are an integral part of the very people whose welfare the state is constitutionally mandated to tirelessly protect.

Formally, without delving into specifics, one might assume that ANY indicator of EE demonstrating steady positive growth always and optimally reflects a simultaneous, universal rise in

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public welfare, since well-being "decisively depends on the pace of economic development" [1]. This creates the illusion that a national government, possessing a vast array of EE indicators-that is, having timely and reliable data on the country's economic standing-can easily and freely exert the right influence on socio-economic development, thereby ensuring steady social progress. This task appears relatively straightforward because almost all EE indicators are expressed exclusively in quantitative, rational numbers.

Consequently, governing bodies merely need to apply timely regulatory interventions whenever "red" figures appear in EE metrics, promptly setting them "in order" and thereby steadily bringing closer a "bright future."

Based on such a superficial approach to the problem, many people-including economists-have formed a persistent belief that EE is always directed toward the public good and steady social development, and therefore an equal sign can definitively be placed between EE and social efficiency (SE). Moreover, the works of certain economists assert a direct link between these two concepts:
"...social efficiency is derived from economic efficiency, since economic efficiency enables the development and improvement of the well-being of society's members" [2].

Yet is this truly the case? Is it justifiable to equate EE with SE? After all, at a minimum, SE is typically expressed through different indicators and measured in different units. Furthermore, the structure of modern society is highly complex and volatile; the nature of horizontal and vertical social ties is unstable, and public sentiments and aspirations vary widely. Under these conditions, can one claim that the gain of one is ALWAYS the gain of all?
Let us attempt to examine these questions.

The Inefficiency of the "Market Economy" within the Eurasian Civilization

During the failed Gorbachev-Ryzhkov reforms, broad circles of Soviet society, including leading scholars, unexpectedly arrived at the paradoxical conclusion that the most efficient economic model was by no means the planned socialist model-as those very same scholars had asserted for decades-but rather a capitalist, market economy modeled after Western Civilization (WC).

Although market elements continued to exist under Soviet socialism-such as cooperative ownership, self-financing (khozraschet), and contractual prices-meaning that a mixed economic model was in fact functioning, former ardent champions of central planning and state ownership quickly reversed their stance and began zealously arguing for the "indisputable" economic superiority of exclusive private ownership and the unregulated chaos of the free market.

Whether out of ignorance or by design, they propagated a model of capitalism that WC itself had decisively abandoned back in the first third of the twentieth century. At that time, as a result of the Keynesian revolution, capitalism underwent a substantial transformation, handing the levers of national economic management over to the state and allowing it to exercise continuous oversight over its own operations. Thus, by the end of the twentieth century, the difference between capitalism and socialism was practically reduced to a specific ratio between state and private capital shares within a nation's economy. Agitators and propagandists extolling the miracles of the free market and its "invisible hand" completely ignored this fact in their treatises-such as There Is No Other Way and quite rapidly steered public opinion across the entire country toward the "only true path": primitive capitalism [1].

The manipulation of public consciousness and the mass brainwashing of the Soviet people ultimately culminated in a deftly executed privatization-a grandiose operation to strip public property from its rightful owners and transfer it into private hands. The primary argument used to "prove" the necessity of this operation was the reformers' assurance that only in this manner could an "accelerated growth of public welfare" be achieved. A specific timeline for attaining this "common good" was even named: just 500 days. The hastily executed "shock therapy" reforms suffered a complete collapse. Instead of an "accelerated growth of public welfare," the population's purchasing power plummeted severalfold within literally a couple of years the provision of free housing, kindergartens, and health resort vouchers for those in need ceased; and antisocial phenomena such as crime and drug addiction surged dramatically [3]. Added to this in abundance were previously unheard-of phenomena, including open and hidden unemployment, wage arrears and prolonged non-payment of salaries, mass layoffs, and so on.

Simultaneously, the capacity of local authorities to provide even minimal support to the distressed population dropped virtually to zero.

How and why the reform mechanism proved so destructive for the overwhelming majority of the population can be vividly illustrated by the privatization of the state-owned Eastern Oil Company (VNK). By the mid-1990s, when the country had been pushed to the brink of survival, the Tomsk Region appeared to be an oasis of calm and prosperity thanks to VNK's active participation in supporting the region's social sphere. VNK supported local budgets, construction, and the social infrastructure of the cities and territories where its divisions operated; it provided assistance to educational and medical institutions and actively promoted regional culture and sports. All of this came to an end in late 1997, when VNK was sold at an "auction" to its sole bidder-the Yukos company-naturally, at an unacceptably undervalued price. The very first public statement by Yukos management was a categorical refusal to support the

region's social sphere, which, in the view of the new owners, was henceforth to be funded solely through the taxes paid by the company in accordance with established law. Subsequent events unfolded as follows:

"Starting in January 1998, the Eastern Oil Company effectively ceased tax and duty payments-remittances were cut in half compared to the previous year...

Soon, YUKOS announced a massive restructuring of Tomskneft. Service and non-core units were spun off from the enterprise, and so-called 'social production enterprises' were created on the basis of low-yield oil fields, their primary task being to preserve jobs and sustain themselves.

Responsibility for their maintenance was effectively handed over to local authorities. In Strezhevoy, mass layoffs of workers began. The mood in the city bordered on panic. People were terrified of being left without jobs, without money, and trapped in rapidly depreciating apartments" [4].

By abandoning social obligations and shutting down marginally profitable wells, Yukos achieved unprecedented EE in domestic oil production. The media tirelessly and enthusiastically reported on the company's outstanding successes in optimizing production and maximizing profits. Yet these reports contained not a single word about the social losses suffered by an entire region-not only in material terms, but most importantly, in moral terms, reflected in the despair of people who, along with their families, were cast aside and left to fend for themselves. The consequences of this social failure, triggered by the disregard for public needs following privatization, are clearly confirmed by demographic dynamics: after the emergence of the "Russian Cross" over Russia (where mortality exceeded birth rates), heralding a new Time of Troubles, the mid-1990s had unexpectedly seen positive population growth in Tomsk and the oil capital of Strezhevoy-a trend that collapsed in 1998 after VNK passed into the hands of Yukos [5]. Only an intense struggle by Governor Victor Kress with the company's management to secure partial funding for the region's social needs allowed the dire situation to be somewhat alleviated.

The loss of employment and future prospects, set against the backdrop of luxury consumption standards aggressively promoted by those very same media outlets, plunged the overwhelming majority of the nation's people into hopeless despair and a state of constant, anxious anticipation of further calamities. People stopped planning their lives, limiting themselves to securing their survival for a day, a week, a month, or at most a year. Thus, as a result of privatization within a nominally social state, antisocial practices became widespread, wiping out the highest social achievements of the Soviet era in the shortest possible time and throwing both the people and the country back into glaring inequality rooted in dishonest machinations-a phenomenon suddenly resurrected from the distant past.

This is merely one example among many tens of thousands of privatization transactions involving national economic entities conducted in the 1990s, yet it convincingly demonstrates the fallacy of equating SE with EE. It is entirely evident that under conditions of private ownership and the dominance of private interests, the mutual relationship between SE and EE can be diametrically opposed; that is, the EE of a private enterprise can come into direct conflict with SE on a societal scale and even inflict direct damage upon it. In essence, the conflict between EE and SE in such cases is a conflict between private and public interests-one which, in a society that positions itself as a social state, must always be resolved in favor of SE.

Furthermore, the damage inflicted on SE by private interests may be accompanied not only by the exacerbation of social problems, but also by the emergence of other crises provoked by a private owner's relentless pursuit of profit-ecological, demographic, and otherwise.

The ruthless dismantling of a familiar way of life and an acute social schism-accompanied by the forced abandonment of former values ("man is to man a friend, comrade, and brother") and their replacement with new ones ("every man for himself")-plunged the country into a series of crises, the most tragic manifestation of which was a rapid population decline. Yet this sharp collapse in SE also triggered another, entirely unexpected effect: despite the high share of the private sector in the national economy-even when compared to certain WC countries-the average EE indicators of the new owners of former public property still remain not only significantly below the global average but also below the achievements of the Soviet period [6].

For instance, while the scale of energy sector development is not a direct expression of EE, it can readily serve as an integral indicator of overall economic development. By this metric, over a 25-year period starting in 1990, electricity generation increased more than tenfold in China and by 40% in the United States, whereas the Russian Federation only regained its 1990 level in 2017 [7]. Moreover, no revolutionary energy-saving technologies were commissioned during this timeframe; on the contrary, throughout the market reforms, electricity consumption per unit of output far exceeded the corresponding figures from the final years of the USSR, as equipment depreciation surpassed all permissible limits.

Traditional Values as a Decisive Factor in the Development of a Country's Socio-Economic System

One of the foundational values of the Eurasian Civilization (EAC) is justice. Nicolai Hartmann provides the following definition of justice:

"The first, approximate meaning of justice is a tendency that opposes the crude egoism of the individual. In his desire to possess the goods of life, the egoist adheres to the following position: everything for me; whatever remains for another is a

matter of indifference. Justice counters this with the following tendency: not everything for me, but the same for me and for the other" [8].

For centuries, the EAC and Russian communal (obshchina) culture were founded upon this principle of human coexistence, guided by it in all manifestations of collective life and activity.

Thanks to this principle, the core of the EAC-the Russian people-managed not only to preserve itself under harsh climatic conditions and survive devastating enemy invasions, but also, predominantly through peaceful means, to maximally expand its influence and worldview to other peoples of Eurasia, uniting them into a single civilization. In the form of the internationalist USSR, this civilization reached the highest peak of its development in the entire history of its existence.

The intricately structured yet unified Soviet national economy-created through the heroic, selfless labor of several generations of Soviet people as common public property-was privatized in the shortest possible time. Moreover, this was carried out with gross violations even of those ultra-preferential and largely dubious decrees and orders (such as the loans-for-shares auctions), which directly contravened traditional norms and conceptions of morality, dignity, honor, collectivism, justice, and respect for the interests of all members of society. An analysis of the privatization processes conducted by the Accounts Chamber in 2004 established, among other things:
"13. The social efficiency of privatization proved to be extremely low. The principles of citizen equality during the implementation of mass privatization and the consideration of the interests and rights of all strata of the population were not observed" [9].

The privatization conducted in the Russian Federation, which justly earned the popular epithet "predatory," had a most pernicious impact on close collective and comradely relations within society, serving as the destructive charge that ruthlessly undermined society's former traditional foundations. Among these foundations is a deep respect for creative labor, which condemns laziness, dependency, and negligence. The traditional view of labor does not endorse egalitarian leveling (uravnilovka); it readily accepts that an exceptionally gifted member of society possessing "golden hands," high work capacity, and ingenuity-someone who knows how to and loves to organize their work rationally-can produce two or three times more output than an ordinary citizen. Regarding attitudes toward labor in a traditional society, no one will object to paying double or triple wages to such a master craftsman. This very same attitude toward labor and its vanguard workers was widespread in the USSR: advanced workers enjoyed not only widespread fame, but also substantial material rewards.

However, the attitude toward the success of vanguard workers changes fundamentally if, within that same traditional society, someone presumes to argue that a certain member of society is capable of surpassing their comrades tenfold or a hundredfold in intellect, resourcefulness, and productivity, and consequently "deserves" an increased reward for their "shock labor" in the exact same proportion. No rational member of society will ever believe such a legend; apart from a skeptical smirk, such a bizarre figment of boundless imagination cannot evoke any other emotion. Yet the matter will not end with sarcasm-following such assertions, people permanently lose all respect for and trust in the purveyors of such tall tales.

One of the primary arguments advanced by free-market propagandists advocating the replacement of the socialist economic model with a capitalist one was the claim that socialism is an unviable, artificial invention of certain aggrieved intellectuals, and is therefore inherently doomed to fail. According to these same propagandists, the capitalist economic model, unlike the socialist one, emerged through a natural, evolutionary process and is thus the only valid path.

The hastily executed privatization campaign in the Russian Federation instantly invalidated this thesis by transferring vast national wealth into the hands of unknown individuals who had previously distinguished themselves in no way whatsoever, having merely-and "unnaturally"-found themselves at the "distribution window" at the right moment. Even in WC, with its somewhat different understanding of justice ("nothing in this life is given for free"), such a mechanism for acquiring vast fortunes is simply inconceivable under any circumstances.

As for the highly sensitive conception of justice prevalent in the EAC, this unnatural transfer of immense national wealth into the hands of "former comrades" who had done nothing to deserve such a lavish gift neither sparked nor could have sparked a surge of enthusiasm or a desire to devote all one's strength and abilities to the benefit of the newly minted nouveaux riches. On the contrary, acute alienation from the fruits of one's labor, the loss of camaraderie, the erosion of a sense of personal involvement in a common cause, and the reduction of diverse professional engagement to a single question-"What's in it for me?"-combined with the low SE of the new social relations, led to the deplorable outcomes demonstrated by the Russian Federation in recent decades: sinking ever lower in rankings of labor productivity, high-tech manufacturing output, and the modernization of industrial equipment, despite all the efforts of the Russian government.

There is nothing surprising in this outcome of market reforms and, above all, privatization. For a worker with a collectivist, communal consciousness, reducing labor motivation over a prolonged period solely to an egoistic struggle for every kopek-in the absence of a shared goal-completely destroys any desire to create, to think inventively, or to spend personal and working time improving one's craft and attempting to make it more

productive and of higher quality. In principle, such a worker cannot derive any creative satisfaction from the work performed. And in the absence of a creative approach to one's duties, there is-and can be-no continuous search for new, more effective solutions, making any discussion of innovative activity moot. Under such workforce motivation, the potential for a country's economic and innovative development remains at the lowest possible level. Conversely, when the social order aligns with a person's conceptions of truth and justice-alongside adequate wages and management quality-it exerts a beneficial influence on their attitude toward work, productivity, and innovative activity. This dependence of a worker's labor effort on their conviction in a just social order rooted in traditional, collectivist relations was convincingly demonstrated by the building of socialism in the USSR, with its still-unrivaled rates of economic growth [10]. and the transformation of backward Russia into the world's second superpower in the shortest possible historical timeframe.

Therefore, one can state with complete confidence that the Russian government's insufficient attention to SE indicators (which is eloquently confirmed, for instance, by a simple comparison of social welfare benefits in the Russian Federation and WC countries) has entailed a nationwide decline in EE and generated a growing lag behind global achievements in science, engineering, and technology. Consequently, the welfare of the people-mandated by the Constitution as the primary goal of the Russian Federation—is neither timely nor fully realized (regrettably, even relevant Presidential Decrees frequently go unfulfilled in the Russian Federation).

From this premise it follows that, first, SE exerts a substantial and exclusively positive influence on the growth of public welfare, whereas EE can affect both SE and societal well-being in a dual manner-both positively and negatively (in fairness, it must be added that SE can also exert a negative impact on EE; for example, during the implementation of large-scale social programs, substantial resources may be diverted away from investments aimed at re-equipping production facilities). Second, SE is inextricably linked to a people's traditional conceptions of society, interpersonal bonds, and what is just and proper.

Today, numerous international organizations closely study the traditional values of countries worldwide. One such organization is the World Values Survey (WVS) comprising leading global social scientists [11]. The primary objective of this association is the global "development of civil society" by counteracting "processes that may lead to an undesirable development of values." According to the charts presented by the WVS, the desirable development of values is to be achieved through the gradual convergence of the unique cultural and religious traditions of various peoples into universal, "common human," liberal values of WC-namely, individualism multiplied by a rational worldview and freedom of self-expression. Only in this way, according to WVS experts, can humanity reach the highest stage of development.

However, first, the liberal socio-economic model of WC known as capitalism is founded on competitive struggle and, consequently, dooms society to a perpetual division into winners and losers. On the scale of nation-states, this means that the prosperity of one small group of countries must be continuously maintained at someone else's expense-that is, at the expense of a much larger group of "loser" countries. Such rules of the game can in no way foster the "harmonious development" of the nations and peoples of the entire planet. Second, the outstanding socio-economic achievements of the People's Republic of China convincingly refute the thesis of an "only true" liberal path blazed by WC.

It follows that the primary objective of such organizations is to reformat the consciousness of the inhabitants of non-Western civilizations in order to suppress the traditional way of life-and, accordingly, the traditional mindset-of non-Western peoples as quickly as possible, turning them into compliant executors and passionate imitators of the will and lifestyle of WC. Clearly, should such programs succeed, the majority of the world's peoples will lose their cultural distinctiveness and self-identity, which is tantamount to the disappearance of the people itself.

Precisely for this reason, it is vital to account for and accurately reflect traditional values within SE metrics and indicators. In other words, traditional values must define the forms and norms of SE. For instance, the Gini coefficient, which measures the degree of social stratification, ought to be substantially lower in the Russian Federation-a country with communal, collectivist traditions and culture-than in WC countries, which traditionally profess notions of exceptionalism (divine election), individualism, and egoism. In reality, the Gini coefficient in the Russian Federation exceeds the corresponding indicators of many WC nations. The significant gap between various social strata in Russia-between the rich and the poor-points to low state SE, fuels growing distrust and social tension, and largely undermines social cohesion and solidarity. Accordingly, this state of affairs simultaneously inflicts substantial damage on the public good, leaving a considerable portion of the population feeling humiliated and deceived.

From the foregoing, it clearly follows that SE exerts a direct and positive influence on activating the "human factor," which, in turn, drives the growth of EE and, as a consequence, the steady improvement of public welfare.

Conclusions

SE is designed to guarantee favorable conditions for living, working, and reproducing the labor force so that individuals in their workplaces continuously feel society's care for them and reciprocate with an active, creative approach to their professional duties. Only under this condition is a steady rise in the well-being of the entire nation possible.

Universal guaranteed employment, equality of opportunity, modern and universally accessible healthcare and education,

comfortable living conditions and utilities, public safety, healthy and diverse nutrition, and an ecologically clean environment-these are the priorities that determine a society's success and toward which SE must be directed in order to achieve the required social outcomes. Ultimately, SE represents the set of measures undertaken by a government to achieve its stated social goal: the universal welfare of the people.

Unlike EE indicators, SE indicators can be expressed both in quantitative, rational numbers-such as the Gini coefficient, standard of living, life expectancy, employment rates, etc.-and in value-based categories and qualitative characteristics, such as justice, confidence in the future, a familiar way of life, social stability, and so forth. In this regard, the attempts of certain researchers to derive a single generalized indicator of a country's socio-economic development-one that simultaneously incorporates not only EE and SE metrics, but also reflects "... political, ecological, scientific-technical, and a number of other factors influencing the quality of life of a region's or country's population" are baffling. According to its authors, such a synthetic indicator can be represented as a function of social, economic, and other factors, whose relative weights are determined using a matrix of corresponding coefficients [12]. Yet is it truly possible to combine quantitative metrics with subjective survey evaluations? How can this be accomplished without severe distortion and a general loss of meaning when dealing with a qualitative social indicator such as "confidence in the future"? The authors fail to demonstrate the mechanism for such a conversion even through basic examples.

Furthermore, as is well known, an indicator must be a specific variable that unambiguously characterizes the state of the object under study. Two or more processes of societal development that differ in essence and content-and which in certain cases directly contradict one another-cannot be represented by a single composite indicator; otherwise, the researcher risks obtaining a distorted picture of the object. Therefore, it is impermissible to lump SE and social progress indicators into a single dataset alongside metrics measuring other aspects of societal life, including EE. Other authors unambiguously warn against the potential errors of such an approach:
"Historical experience has shown that economic efficiency and social justice exist in a complex, contradictory relationship with one another" [13].

For this reason, the widely used metric of GDP per capita growth is incapable of adequately determining the success of a country's socio-economic development. It is a purely economic indicator and reflects the social situation in society only indirectly. According to a number of world-class experts, conducting a more accurate analysis of a society's socio-economic standing requires supplementing this metric with, for example, the Social Progress Index (SPI), which these same experts even propose using as an alternative to GDP [14]. However, they also caution that the SPI is overly subjective and represents a distinctively Western perspective on global order. There is nothing surprising in this assessment, given that the SPI, the HDI, and numerous other non-economic indices of social well-being and happiness are heavily laden with ethical assumptions that strictly mirror the worldview of their developers-representatives of WC.

The traditional values of non-Western civilizations are insufficiently reflected in these indices; consequently, rather than fully capturing the reality, these metrics are quite capable of distorting the actual state of social development in non-Western countries. For the Russian Federation to fully discharge its duties as a social state and reliably avoid such pitfalls, it is essential to maximize public awareness of existing social problems. Doing so requires recalibrating established non-economic indices to bring them into alignment with the traditional values of the EAC. Where necessary, they should be supplemented by developing a domestic suite of indices, metrics, and indicators that fully account for the culture and traditions of the peoples of the EAC.

In any event, the current approach to assessing the country's socio-economic system must be replaced with a more reliable methodology that incorporates the continuous integration of economic calculations with SE indicators. Moreover, to ensure the continuous growth of public welfare, SE indicators must be accorded a distinct priority over EE indicators.

As noted above, the primary obstacle impeding the socio-economic development of the EAC is the societal schism that followed privatization, accompanied by the forced replacement of traditional EAC values with those of WC. The discrepancy between surrounding everyday realities and the internal convictions and conceptions of good and evil instilled in every individual from early childhood prevents the peoples of the EAC from truly unlocking their inexhaustible creative and constructive potential. It is precisely for this reason that the lagging of the domestic economy, science, engineering, and technology behind global achievements persists and even intensifies.

Based on this conclusion, one can assert with full confidence that as long as a discrepancy remains in the worker's consciousness between the actual social relations observed every day and the traditional values and worldview in which they were raised-and which have been instilled in them from early childhood by the millennial culture of their ancestors-any measures undertaken by the Russian government to elevate the national economy to a global standard of development will prove futile and fail to yield the desired results.

Therefore, both the government of the Russian Federation and Russian society face the task of elevating SE to a high standard worthy of our country and our people-a standard that every resident of the Russian Federation must tangibly experience; only under this condition will the well-being of our people achieve

sustainable growth. This is the imperative of our time, and at a minimum, it entails the necessity of bringing key SE indicators into a satisfactory state-above all those reflecting living standards and life expectancy, equality of opportunity, access to education, modern healthcare, and housing, improvements in working and living conditions, and compliance with environmental standards. Yet the single most important indicator of SE—at least for the EAC-has always been, and remains, population growth.

If, however, everything is left as it is and policy remains oriented solely toward EE, profit, and commercial viability, the outcome against which Sergey Georgievich Kara-Murza warned us becomes entirely possible:

"For us in Russia today, it is especially urgent to understand how the massive introduction of the institutions and customs of the Western market economy into our national economy affects the entire system of bonds among our people. In the long run, this impact is far more consequential than its direct effect on strictly economic outcomes (GDP, national wealth, income distribution, etc.). After all, a scenario is entirely possible in which the economy on our former territory becomes efficient, but the Russian people no longer exist (as happened, for example, with the Native Americans in the United States)" [15].

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