

Institutional Order Flow Analytics: Decoding Smart Money Signals in U.S. Equity and Options Markets

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ABSTRACT

Institutional order flow — the aggregate directional trading activity of informed, large-capital market participants including hedge funds, asset managers, proprietary trading desks, and market makers — leaves systematic, detectable footprints across both lit and dark market venues. Drawing on 19+ years of institutional trading experience at Citigroup, HSBC Global Banking and Markets, Northern Trust, and Sapient (Publicis Sapient), this paper presents a practitioner framework for identifying, interpreting, and acting on institutional order flow signals in U.S. equity and options markets. The framework integrates four analytical layers:

- Options market flow analytics including unusual call and put sweep identification, open interest positioning, and implied volatility surface distortions;
- Dark pool print analysis and off-exchange volume concentration;
- Level 2 order book dynamics and large-lot tape reading;
- Price-action confirmation via Anchored VWAP alignment.

The paper argues that the systematic integration of these four layers provides retail and professional traders with a meaningful approximation of institutional directional intent — substantially reducing the information asymmetry that has historically disadvantaged non-institutional market participants. Practitioner case studies are presented, and implications for trading education, retail investor protection, and market microstructure research are discussed. The framework represents the first integrated, practitioner-grounded methodology synthesizing these four data streams into a unified institutional order flow analytics system, and constitutes the second paper in the author's series on institutional trading methodology accessible to retail and professional market participants.

Keywords: Institutional Order Flow, Dark Pools, Options Sweep, Market Microstructure, VWAP, Informed Trading, Level 2 Order Book, Tape Reading, ATS Data, Smart Money

JEL Codes

G12 (Asset Pricing)

G14 (Information and Market Efficiency)

G17 (Financial Forecasting and Simulation)

G23 (Non-bank Financial Institutions)

Introduction

The Structural Information Asymmetry in US Equity Markets

Financial markets are, at their core, information-processing mechanisms. Prices aggregate the dispersed beliefs, expectations, and private information of thousands of heterogeneous participants, converging — in theory — on efficient valuations that reflect all available information [1]. In practice, however, markets are characterized by profound and persistent information

asymmetries. No asymmetry is more consequential than the one that separates institutional participants from their retail counterparts.

Institutional market participants — hedge funds, registered investment advisers, proprietary trading desks, and market makers — possess several structural advantages over retail investors. They command superior research resources, proprietary data subscriptions, co-located execution infrastructure, and — critically — real-time visibility into their own aggregate order flow. A hedge fund managing \$5 billion in assets, positioning directionally ahead of a macroeconomic catalyst, generates a magnitude of market activity that, while individually unobservable to any single retail participant, leaves systematic and detectable footprints across multiple market venues simultaneously. These footprints — in the options market, in dark pool volume data, in the Level 2 order book, and in price-action structure — constitute what this paper terms institutional order flow signals.

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The structural information asymmetry between institutional and retail participants is not a passive feature of market design; it is actively exploited. Empirical evidence from market microstructure research consistently documents that informed institutional traders earn systematic returns at the expense of uninformed retail counterparties [2-4]. Understanding the precise mechanisms by which institutional participants embed directional information into observable market data is, therefore, not merely an academic exercise — it is a question of practical and regulatory significance.

From Floor Trading to Electronic Markets: Democratized Access, Amplified Complexity

The structure of U.S. equity markets has undergone a fundamental transformation over the past three decades. The migration from floor-based specialist systems at the New York Stock Exchange to fully electronic, highly fragmented market structures — accelerated by the implementation of Regulation NMS in 2005 — democratized market access in ways previously unimaginable. Commission costs collapsed toward zero, execution speeds compressed to microseconds, and retail investors gained direct access to markets that had historically required significant capital and institutional intermediation.

Yet this democratization carried an underappreciated cost: the simultaneous amplification of informational complexity. When trading occurred on a single exchange floor, price discovery was transparent and centralized. A single specialist's book displayed the state of supply and demand. In the current fragmented market structure, comprising over 60 distinct trading venues — including 16 national securities exchanges, more than 30 registered Alternative Trading Systems (ATS), and a constellation of internalizers — the same security may be trading simultaneously in dozens of venues, each with distinct microstructure characteristics, participant composition, and informational content [5].

This fragmentation is not neutral in its distributional consequences. Sophisticated institutional participants have invested billions of dollars in technology and data infrastructure to navigate, and profit from, market fragmentation. The retail participant who gained "access" to markets through the democratization of brokerage has simultaneously faced a more complex, less transparent informational environment than at any prior point in market history.

The Emergence of Publicly Available Institutional Signal Data

A significant and underappreciated development of the past decade has been the emergence of publicly available data streams that allow sophisticated market observers to partially reconstruct institutional order flow from observable market data. Four primary data streams are relevant to the framework developed in this paper:

- Options flow data feeds, available through commercial vendors (e.g., Unusual Whales, Market Chameleon, Cheddar Flow), aggregate real-time options tape data and flag transactions that are statistically anomalous relative to a stock's typical options activity. These feeds surface institutional positioning in the options market — a venue

that offers institutional participants leverage, capital efficiency, and informational opacity relative to direct equity purchases.

- FINRA ATS Transparency Data, published weekly by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, reports aggregate trading volume by individual ATS (dark pool) venue, including volume broken down by security. While subject to a one-week reporting lag, this data provides unambiguous evidence of off-exchange institutional block trading activity.
- Level 2 order book data, available through most professional brokerage platforms, provides real-time visibility into the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO) and the depth of the order book across multiple price levels — allowing practitioners to observe the formation and removal of large institutional orders in real time.
- Time and Sales (tape) data, the real-time record of every executed transaction in a security, allows experienced practitioners to distinguish the speed, size, and directional character of institutional execution patterns from retail transaction noise.

The existence of these data streams does not, by itself, resolve the information asymmetry problem. Data without interpretive framework is noise. It is the practitioner's ability to systematically contextualize and synthesize these streams — informed by deep experience with how institutional participants actually trade — that converts raw data into actionable signal.

The Practitioner's Dilemma

The academic market microstructure literature has made substantial progress in characterizing institutional trading behavior from a theoretical and empirical standpoint. The models of Kyle and Glosten and Milgrom provide rigorous frameworks for understanding how informed traders embed private information into the price discovery process [2,3]. The empirical work of Pan and Poteshman, Cao, Chen, and Griffin, and Easley, López de Prado, and O'Hara documents the informational content of options flow, pre-announcement trading patterns, and order flow toxicity with statistical precision [6-8].

What the existing literature does not provide is an integrated, operational framework suitable for real-time practitioner application. The academic literature studies these phenomena in isolation, using post-hoc datasets and statistical methodologies that, while rigorous, do not translate directly into the day-to-day practice of identifying and acting on institutional order flow signals. This gap — between the richness of the academic evidence base and the practitioner's need for an integrated, actionable methodology — motivates the present paper.

Paper Contribution and Organization

This paper makes the following contributions to both the academic literature and practitioner knowledge base. First, it presents the first integrated four-layer framework for institutional order flow analytics, synthesizing options flow signals, dark pool print analysis, Level 2 order book dynamics, and Anchored VWAP price-action confirmation into a unified decision-making methodology. Second, it grounds this framework explicitly in 19+ years of institutional trading experience across Citigroup, HSBC Global Banking and Markets, Northern Trust, and

Sapient (Publicis Sapient), lending practitioner validity to the methodological choices made. Third, it presents three hypothetical case studies illustrating the framework in action, demonstrating the interpretive logic that converts multi-layered market data into directional conviction.

The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant academic literature. Section 3 provides a structural overview of the U.S. equity market venues where institutional order flow manifests. Sections 4 through 7 present each of the four analytical layers in detail. Section 8 integrates the four layers into a unified decision framework. Section 9 discusses implications for financial education and retail investor protection. Section 10 concludes with a call for future empirical research.

The precise count of active trading venues fluctuates. The figure cited reflects approximate conditions as of early 2026, drawing on SEC market structure data and FINRA ATS participant registries.

Literature Review

Market Microstructure and Informed Trading

The theoretical foundations of institutional order flow analysis rest on the market microstructure literature's treatment of informed trading. Kyle's seminal model of continuous auctions with insider trading established the foundational insight that informed traders systematically exploit private information by strategically sizing and timing their orders to conceal their informational advantage from market makers [2]. In Kyle's framework, noise traders provide the "camouflage" that allows the informed trader to extract rents without immediately revealing their information in the price. The model generates the key prediction that prices are a linear function of order flow, with the slope parameter — Kyle's λ — representing market illiquidity, or the price impact of a unit of order flow. This prediction has been extensively verified empirically and has direct practical relevance: the sensitivity of price to order flow imbalance is itself a signal of the informational content of that flow.

Glosten and Milgrom provide a complementary perspective through their adverse selection model of bid-ask spread formation [3]. In this framework, market makers set spreads to compensate for the risk of trading against an informed counterparty — an insight that explains why spreads widen in anticipation of information events and why options market makers charge higher implied volatility premiums when directional order flow is elevated. The Glosten-Milgrom model formalizes the mechanism by which institutional order flow imposes costs on the market-making function — a mechanism that generates the observable IV skew distortions that form a key component of Layer 1 of the framework developed in this paper.

Hasbrouck extended this line of research by developing a vector autoregression (VAR) framework to decompose the price impact of trades into permanent (informational) and transitory (liquidity) components [9]. This decomposition — between the component of price movement that reflects genuine information revelation and the component that reflects temporary liquidity effects — is conceptually central to the tape reading practices

described in Layer 3 of this paper. Experienced tape readers are, in essence, performing an intuitive decomposition analogous to Hasbrouck's econometric framework [9].

Dark Pool Trading and Market Quality

The proliferation of dark pool trading — off-exchange execution in Alternative Trading Systems that do not display pre-trade quotes to the public — has generated a substantial academic debate regarding its implications for price discovery and market quality. Zhu provides an important theoretical treatment, demonstrating that dark pools disproportionately attract informed institutional traders when the market is liquid, because liquid conditions reduce the execution risk of dark pool participation [10]. This result has the important corollary that elevated dark pool volume in a liquid stock is a stronger signal of informed institutional activity than the same volume level in an illiquid stock — a nuance that the framework developed in this paper explicitly incorporates.

Comerton-Forde and Putniņš conduct a large-scale empirical analysis of dark trading's relationship with price discovery across U.S. [11]. and European equity markets. Their findings are nuanced: moderate levels of dark trading are associated with improved price efficiency, but high concentrations of dark trading — particularly in opaque dark pools with minimal pre-trade transparency — are associated with degraded price discovery. For practitioner purposes, this finding suggests that very high dark pool concentration in a specific stock, while potentially a signal of institutional accumulation or distribution, may also indicate periods of reduced price discovery reliability — a risk factor to incorporate into framework application.

Foley and Putniņš further document that dark pool trades carry information about future price movements, with the information content of dark trades being particularly pronounced for institutional block trades [12]. This finding provides empirical support for the dark pool print analysis that constitutes Layer 2 of the framework developed in this paper.

Options Market Informational Content

The options market has been extensively studied as a venue for informed trading, and the evidence consistently supports the view that options order flow carries significant information about future equity price movements. Pan and Poteshman provide perhaps the most comprehensive evidence, documenting that put-call volume ratios constructed from non-market-maker options trades strongly predict next-day and nextweek stock returns. Specifically, stocks with unusually high put volume relative to call volume earn significantly negative abnormal returns in the subsequent period — a result consistent with informed bearish positioning in the options market preceding price declines in the underlying equity [6].

Cao, Chen, and Griffin examine options trading activity in the period preceding merger and acquisition announcements, finding that call option volume — particularly out-of-the-money calls — is significantly elevated in target companies in the days immediately preceding public announcement [7]. This result is among the strongest empirical evidence that options markets serve as a primary venue for informed institutional positioning

ahead of information events, and it directly motivates the unusual options activity (UOA) detection methodology described in Section 4.

Ge, Lin, and Pearson document that implied volatility spread — the difference between implied volatilities of call and put options with the same moneyness — predicts future stock returns [13]. This finding is consistent with the IV skew analysis described in Layer 1: asymmetric shifts in the implied volatility surface reflect asymmetric informed demand for directional options exposure, and these shifts carry predictive information about subsequent equity price movements.

Hu demonstrates that options order imbalance — the net directional flow in options markets — predicts future equity returns even after controlling for the information content of equity order imbalance [14]. This finding supports the view that options markets contain distinct informational content not fully reflected in equity price action — a cornerstone assumption of the framework presented in this paper.

Order Flow Toxicity: The VPIN Measure

Easley, López de Prado, and O'Hara introduced the Volume-synchronized Probability of Informed trading (VPIN) metric as a real-time measure of order flow toxicity — the degree to which order flow in a given period is driven by informed rather than uninformed participants. VPIN is computed as the ratio of directional order flow imbalance to total volume within volume-bucketed time intervals, and has been shown to be a leading indicator of short-term volatility and adverse selection costs. Elevated VPIN readings precede episodes of sharp, one-directional price movement — consistent with the interpretation that high order flow toxicity reflects concentrated informed trading activity.

The VPIN framework has direct conceptual relevance to the integrated methodology developed in this paper. The multi-layer signal framework described in Sections 4 through 7 can be understood as a practitioner approximation of VPIN-style order flow toxicity assessment — using observable market signals (options sweeps, dark pool prints, tape patterns) as proxies for the directional order imbalance that formal VPIN computation requires exchange-level tick data to measure precisely.

Retail versus Institutional Trading Behavior

The behavioral finance literature has extensively documented the informational disadvantage of retail investors relative to institutional counterparts. Barber and Odean demonstrate that retail investors trade too frequently, incur excessive transaction costs, and earn systematically inferior returns relative to passive benchmarks — findings consistent with the adverse selection framework of Glosten and Milgrom. Kaniel, Saar, and Titman provide a more nuanced picture, documenting that retail investor order imbalances positively predict short-horizon returns — a finding that has been interpreted as evidence that some retail traders act as contrarian liquidity providers who earn compensation for bearing short-term risk [3, 4, 15].

Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam examine market-wide order flow imbalances and their relationship with price and liquidity

dynamics, demonstrating that aggregate order flow imbalances are significantly autocorrelated and that their resolution is associated with mean reversion in prices — findings relevant to the tape reading and order book dynamics described in Layers 3 and 4 of the framework [16].

The Gap in the Literature

While the academic literature provides rich theoretical and empirical foundations for each component of the framework developed in this paper, no existing work synthesizes options flow analytics, dark pool print analysis, Level 2 order book dynamics, and VWAP price action confirmation into a unified, operationally actionable institutional order flow analytics system. This gap reflects a structural divide between academic and practitioner approaches to market analysis. Academic studies typically examine one data stream in isolation using post-hoc datasets and statistical methodologies; practitioner frameworks, while operationally rich, are rarely documented with sufficient rigor for academic evaluation or broad dissemination. The present paper is designed to bridge this divide — grounding a practitioner framework in the academic literature while preserving the operational specificity required for real-world application.

Market Structure Overview: Where Institutional Flow Occurs

U.S. Equity Market Fragmentation

To understand where institutional order flow manifests and how it can be detected, it is necessary to first understand the structure of the markets through which that flow passes.

The U.S. equity market is among the most fragmented trading environments in the world. At the national exchange level, securities are traded across venues including the New York

Stock Exchange (NYSE) and its affiliated exchanges, NASDAQ and its affiliated markets, CBOE Global Markets (operator of BATS, BZX, BYX, EDGX, and EDGA exchanges), and IEX — each with distinct fee structures, order type menus, and participant compositions.

Beyond the national exchanges, a constellation of off-exchange venues processes a substantial and growing fraction of total U.S. equity volume. FINRA data consistently indicates that off-exchange trading — encompassing ATS (dark pool) volume and internalized retail order flow — accounts for approximately 40–50% of total consolidated equity volume on any given trading day.² This off-exchange share has grown materially over the past decade as payment for order flow (PFOF) arrangements have concentrated retail order flow with a small number of wholesale market makers, while institutional block trading has migrated to ATS venues to minimize market impact.

Lit versus Dark Venues: Institutional Order Routing Logic

"Lit" venues — national securities exchanges — display pre-trade quotes and post-trade data in real time. They are characterized by continuous two-sided quote competition, price priority rules, and relatively tight spreads in liquid securities. For institutional participants seeking to execute small- to medium-sized orders with minimal market impact, lit venues are efficient and sufficient.

However, when institutional participants seek to execute large block orders — tens of thousands to millions of shares — lit venue execution poses a fundamental problem: display of a large order reveals directional intent to the market, invites front-running, and generates adverse price impact before the full order is filled. The solution developed by institutional participants is to route large orders to dark venues, where orders interact without pre-trade display, and executions are reported post-trade with a reporting delay. The strategic logic is straightforward: if a \$200 million institutional manager needs to accumulate a 500,000-share position in a \$50 stock, executing that accumulation in dark venues over multiple sessions minimizes the price impact of the buying program — preserving the informational edge that motivated the position in the first place.

FINRA ATS Transparency Data

Since 2014, FINRA has published weekly aggregate trading volume data by individual ATS, including stock-level volume. This data — the FINRA ATS Transparency Dataset — is publicly available and represents one of the most important sources of institutional order flow information accessible to non-institutional market participants. The data is subject to a one-week reporting lag and is aggregated at the weekly level, but it provides unambiguous evidence of which stocks are experiencing elevated dark pool activity relative to their historical norms.

The interpretive logic of FINRA ATS data is straightforward but requires experience to apply correctly. A spike in a stock's weekly ATS volume relative to its 4-week average — particularly when

concentrated in one or two ATS venues — is consistent with institutional block trading activity. The directional interpretation (accumulation versus distribution) requires integration with the other framework layers: dark pool volume alone does not reveal direction.

The Options Market as an Institutional Positioning Venue

The options market occupies a unique role in the institutional order flow framework because it is simultaneously a hedging venue, a leverage vehicle, and a strategic positioning tool. Options markets span multiple exchanges — the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE), NYSE American Options, Nasdaq PHLX, BOX Exchange, and several others — with order flow consolidated and displayed through the Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA). The options market allows institutional participants to express directional views with capital efficiency unavailable in the equity market: a \$10 million investment in call options can control an equity exposure that would require \$200 million or more of direct equity investment, depending on strike selection.

This capital efficiency, combined with the directional specificity of options positioning (strike selection reveals target price levels, expiration selection reveals time horizons), makes the options market an extraordinarily information-rich environment. As the empirical literature reviewed in Section 2 consistently documents, options order flow leads equity price discovery in many market environments — making options flow analysis the primary and highest-conviction layer of the institutional order flow analytics framework.

Table 1: US Equity and Options Market Venue Taxonomy — Institutional Order Flow Relevance

Venue Type	Examples	Pre-Trade Transparency	Primary Institutional Use	Framework Layer
National Exchange (Lit)	NYSE, NASDAQ, CBOE BZX, IEX	Full (displayed quotes)	Small-mid block, algo execution	Layer 3 (L2 / Tape)
ATS / Dark Pool	IEX Dark, Liquidnet, Instinet, Credit Suisse CrossFinder	None (dark)	Large block accumulation / distribution	Layer 2 (Dark Pool)
Internalizer	Citadel Connect, Virtu MatchIt	None	Retail order internalization	Layer 3 (Tape context)
Venue Type	Examples	Pre-Trade Transparency	Primary Institutional Use	Framework Layer
Options Exchange	CBOE, Nasdaq PHLX, NYSE American, BOX	Full (OPRA consolidated)	Directional positioning, hedging, leverage	Layer 1 (Options Flow)

FINRA OTC Transparency Data and SEC Market Structure Data; off-exchange share figures are approximate 12month averages as of early 2026 and fluctuate with market conditions.

Layer 1 — Options Flow Analytics

The Options Market as an Institutional Positioning Ledger

Among the four analytical layers of the institutional order flow framework, options flow analytics occupy the position of primary signal — the highest-conviction, highest-information-content data stream available to practitioners outside the institutional trading ecosystem. The logic of this primacy is straightforward: when a sophisticated institutional participant makes a large directional bet, the options market offers capital efficiency, defined risk, and — critically — the ability to establish

a position before the underlying equity reflects that conviction. A hedge fund manager with a directional thesis on a large cap equity will frequently establish options exposure — sweeping the ask across multiple option strikes and expirations — before initiating or completing any equity position. The options market, in this sense, is the institutional participant's preferred "first draft" of a directional trade.

The practical implication of this behavior pattern is that unusual options activity frequently precedes the corresponding price move in the underlying equity by one to five trading sessions. This lead-lag relationship is the empirical basis for options flow analytics as a predictive framework, and it is well-supported in the academic literature [6,7,14].

Key Signal Types in Options Flow Analysis

Call Sweeps versus Ask-Side Buying. Not all options activity signals the same level of institutional conviction. The distinction between a "call sweep" and ordinary ask-side options buying is fundamental to signal quality assessment. A call sweep occurs when a buyer submits a large market order for call options that, in the process of being filled, sweeps across multiple exchanges in sequence — purchasing all available ask-side liquidity at each exchange before moving to the next. The sweep behavior signals urgency: the buyer is willing to pay up for immediate execution and is not waiting for a passive fill at a preferred price. This urgency is characteristic of institutional participants who have a high conviction directional view and need to establish their position before the underlying equity moves. By contrast, passive ask-side buying — large options orders placed at or near the bid that accumulate over extended periods — may reflect institutional positioning but does not carry the same urgency signal.

Unusual Options Activity (UOA)

Defining Statistical Thresholds. Unusual options activity is defined, for purposes of this framework, as options transaction volume that exceeds a statistically significant threshold relative to the security's historical baseline. Two primary metrics are employed:

- The ratio of daily options volume to open interest (OI), with a ratio exceeding 0.50 (i.e., daily volume equivalent to 50% of existing open interest) constituting a meaningful UOA threshold;
- The ratio of daily options volume to the 20-day average daily options volume, with a ratio exceeding 3.0x constituting a high-conviction UOA signal.

These thresholds are calibrated to balance sensitivity (capturing genuine institutional activity) with specificity (minimizing false positives from earnings-driven retail speculation).

Put/Call Flow Ratio Distortions. The put/call volume ratio — the ratio of total put contract volume to total call contract volume traded in a given security on a given day — provides a directional bias indicator. Elevated put/call ratios (typically defined as ratios exceeding 1.5x for individual equities) can reflect either institutional bearish directional positioning or institutional hedging of existing long equity exposure. Distinguishing between these two cases requires integration with the other

framework layers: bearish positioning will typically manifest with put sweeps and elevated open interest in out-of-the-money puts, while hedging activity tends to appear in at-the-money puts with nearer term expirations.

Open Interest Concentration: Strike Price Clusters as Magnetic Price Levels. Open interest (OI) — the total number of outstanding options contracts in a given strike and expiration — is a lagging but structurally important signal. When open interest is heavily concentrated at specific strike prices (particularly when that concentration has built gradually over multiple sessions, indicating accumulation rather than a single block trade), those strike prices become consequential for price discovery through the mechanism of options market-maker delta hedging. Market makers who have sold a large number of call options at a specific strike will delta-hedge by purchasing the underlying equity as the stock approaches that strike — a mechanical buying pressure that can produce a self-reinforcing price move toward the strike. These OI-concentrated strikes are referred to, in practitioner terminology, as "magnetic levels" or "max pain" strikes — prices that exercise significant gravitational pull on short-term price dynamics.

Implied Volatility Surface Analysis. The implied volatility (IV) surface — the three-dimensional representation of implied volatility as a function of strike price (moneyness) and expiration — encodes the options market's collective assessment of directional risk. Asymmetric distortions in the IV surface carry directional signal. Specifically, a steepening of the IV skew on the call side (out-of-the-money calls trading at elevated IV relative to at-the-money options) signals institutional demand for upside call exposure — consistent with bullish directional positioning. Conversely, a steepening of the put-side skew signals elevated demand for downside protection or bearish directional exposure. IV surface analysis adds a second-order layer of confirmation to sweep and UOA signals: when a call sweep is accompanied by a simultaneous steepening of the upside IV skew, the convergence of these two signals substantially elevates conviction.

The Practitioner's Signal Classification System: Tier 1, 2, and 3

The author's institutional experience motivates a three-tier classification system for options flow signals, designed to impose interpretive discipline and prevent the common practitioner error of treating all unusual options activity as equally significant.

Table 2: Options Flow Signal Classification — Tier Definitions and Criteria

Tier	Label	Required Characteristics	Action Implication
Tier 1	High Conviction	Sweep execution; volume/OI ratio > 0.5; multi-exchange sweep; premium > \$500K; near-term expiration (14–45 DTE); OTM or ATM strike; IV skew corroboration	Primary signal — advance to Layers 2–4 for confirmation
Tier 2	Confirming	Large block (not sweep); volume/OI ratio 0.2–0.5; significant premium; longer-dated expiration; OR: multiple smaller sweeps accumulating same directional bias over 2–3 sessions	Supporting signal — increases conviction when Tier 1 present; standalone watchlist only
Tier 3	Noise	Small premium; very long-dated expiration (180+ DTE, likely hedging); deep OTM; earnings-adjacent; retail-sized lots	Disregard for directional purposes; log for statistical tracking only

The Tier 1 / Tier 2 / Tier 3 classification is not mechanical; it requires practitioner judgment. A single metric crossing a threshold does not automatically assign a tier. The classification requires holistic assessment of the full set of signal characteristics. This is precisely the interpretive expertise that 19+ years of institutional trading experience enables — and why the framework, while systematized, cannot be reduced to a purely algorithmic rule set.

Layer 2 — Dark Pool Print Analysis

What Dark Pool Prints Represent

Dark pool prints — the post-trade records of large block transactions executed in Alternative Trading Systems — represent the most direct observable evidence of institutional block trading activity in the equity market. When an institutional asset manager needs to accumulate or liquidate a position of significant size, the structural incentive to use dark pool venues is compelling: dark pool execution avoids the pre-trade display requirement of lit exchanges, preventing other market participants from identifying and front-running the institutional order. The price paid for this opacity is the absence of the price improvement that competitive quote competition on lit exchanges can provide — a trade-off that large institutions consistently accept in exchange for execution certainty on large block orders.

For the practitioner, dark pool prints observable in post-trade data provide a retrospective window into institutional block activity. While the printing participant's identity is not disclosed, the size, price, and timing of dark pool executions carry interpretive information when analyzed in the context of the other framework layers.

Accessing and Interpreting FINRA ATS Weekly Data

FINRA's ATS Transparency Data, published at finramarkets.morningstar.com/MarketData/EquityData/DarkPool, provides weekly aggregate volume for each registered ATS broken down by security.

The dataset includes:

- Total shares traded per security per ATS;
- The number of transactions;
- The percentage of total reported volume represented by ATS trades.

For practical signal generation, the key analytical steps are as follows:

- **Relative dark pool concentration:** Calculate the ratio of the current week's ATS volume for a given security to its 4-week trailing average ATS volume. A ratio exceeding 2.5x merits further investigation as a potential institutional accumulation or distribution signal.
- **ATS concentration analysis:** Identify whether the elevated ATS volume is concentrated in one or two specific ATS venues (suggesting a single institutional participant routing to their preferred execution venue) or broadly distributed across many venues (suggesting either multiple participants or algorithmic distribution across venues).
- **Cross-referencing with equity price action:** Dark pool volume spikes that occur during periods of minimal equity price movement — i.e., the stock absorbs significant

block trading without a corresponding price response — is the strongest signal of institutional accumulation. Price stability during high-volume dark pool activity implies that a large buyer is absorbing available sell-side supply without exhausting it — consistent with a patient, large-scale institutional accumulation program.

The Predictive Signal in Dark Pool Prints: Bid-Side versus Offer-Side Prints The directional signal in individual dark pool prints — to the extent they can be identified through commercial data providers that report individual large-lot transactions — depends critically on whether the print occurs at or near the bid price or the offer price of the prevailing NBBO at the time of execution. The interpretive convention, consistent with the academic literature and practitioner experience, is as follows:

- **Prints at or below the bid:** Consistent with institutional accumulation. A buyer willing to execute at the bid price (rather than waiting for a better price in a dark pool midpoint match) is signaling urgency to acquire shares — a bullish directional signal.
- **Prints at the midpoint:** Consistent with institutional block crossing — two institutional counterparties agreeing to transact at the midpoint of the NBBO. Directional signal is ambiguous without additional context from other framework layers.
- **Prints at or above the offer:** Consistent with institutional distribution. A seller willing to accept a price at or above the current offer is signaling urgency to exit shares — a bearish directional signal or evidence of large-scale portfolio rebalancing.

Dark Pool Prints Relative to Anchored VWAP

The most powerful dark pool print signal arises when a significant dark print occurs at or below a key Anchored VWAP level (see Section 7 for a full treatment of Anchored VWAP methodology). Anchored VWAP levels represent price points of institutional cost-basis significance — the volume-weighted average price of a security from a significant market event or structural low. When an institutional participant executes a large dark pool purchase at or below an Anchored VWAP level, the interpretive signal is highly specific: the institutional participant is either establishing a new position at what they assess to be a technically favorable entry, or is adding to an existing position that was originally established near that VWAP anchor. Both scenarios carry bullish forward-looking implications, and the combination of dark pool volume and Anchored VWAP price structure constitutes one of the highest-conviction signals in the four-layer framework.

Limitations of Dark Pool Print Analysis

The practitioner applying dark pool print analysis must remain cognizant of its limitations. First, FINRAATS weekly data carries a one-week reporting lag, reducing its utility for short-term signal generation. Real-time dark pool print visibility, available through commercial platforms that report post-trade ATS prints within seconds or minutes of execution, partially addresses this lag but introduces data quality and completeness concerns. Second, not all large dark pool prints are directional; portfolio rebalancing, index reconstitution driven trades, and risk transfer transactions between institutional counterparties generate large dark pool

prints that carry no directional informational content. Third, the identity of the trading counterparties is not disclosed, making it impossible to determine with certainty whether elevated dark pool activity in a given stock reflects a single large institutional participant or the coincidental aggregation of multiple smaller institutional participants with no coordinated directional view. These limitations reinforce the framework's insistence on multi-layer confirmation before acting on any single signal.

Layer 3 — Level 2 Order Book and Tape Reading

The Level 2 Order Book as a Real-Time Supply and Demand Map

The Level 2 order book — the display of bid and ask quotes at multiple price levels from multiple market participants — provides the practitioner with a real-time, high-resolution view of supply and demand conditions in the equity market at any given moment. Unlike the top-of-book NBBO, which shows only the best available bid and ask price, the Level 2 display reveals the depth of the book across multiple price levels, allowing the practitioner to identify where significant buying or selling interest is concentrated and how that concentration evolves in real time.

It is important to acknowledge a critical interpretive limitation of Level 2 data in the current market structure: the displayed order book reflects only orders resting on lit exchanges, while dark pool orders and internalized retail flow are by definition invisible. The Level 2 display is therefore an incomplete picture of total order flow — it shows the publicly declared portion of supply and demand, while concealing the off-exchange activity that, as discussed in Section 5, may carry the highest informational content. This limitation reinforces the necessity of the multi-layer framework: Level 2 analysis must be contextualized by, not substituted for, dark pool and options flow analysis.

Identifying Institutional "Walls": Large Resting Orders as Strategic Tools

Large resting orders in the Level 2 book — commonly referred to as "walls" when they substantially exceed the typical size of surrounding orders — are a subject of considerable interpretive nuance. A large resting bid order (a "bid wall") at a price level below the current market is, at face value, a signal of institutional buying interest at that level. If the bid wall holds as the price approaches it — i.e., the order does not disappear before it is tested — it functions as a de facto support level, absorbing sell-side pressure and potentially arresting a downward price move. Conversely, a large resting ask order (an "offer wall") above the current market signals institutional willingness to sell a large quantity at that price — capping upside price movement until the offer is exhausted.

However, the experienced practitioner is alert to the phenomenon of "spoofing" — the submission of large orders with the intent to create a false impression of supply or demand, followed by cancellation before those orders can be filled. While spoofing is prohibited under the Dodd-Frank Act (2010) and subject to active FINRA and SEC enforcement, its historical prevalence has conditioned sophisticated market participants to view Level 2 bid and offer walls with a degree of interpretive skepticism. The key differentiator between a genuine institutional wall and a spoofed order is the order's persistence: a genuine institutional

order remains in the book and absorbs price interaction, while a spoofed order typically disappears as the price approaches it.

Time and Sales Tape Analysis

The Time and Sales record — the sequential log of every executed transaction in a security, showing price, size, time of execution, and exchange of execution — is the practitioner's highest-resolution window into intraday order flow. Tape reading, as traditionally practiced by institutional traders on exchange floors, required the visual parsing of a physical ticker tape. In the electronic era, tape reading occurs on digital Time and Sales displays, but the interpretive principles remain substantially unchanged.

Key tape reading signals relevant to the institutional order flow framework include:

- **Large-lot prints at the ask:** Executions of large block sizes (typically 5,000 shares or more in large-cap equities) at or above the offer price signal aggressive institutional buying — buyers unwilling to wait for a passive fill, accepting the full offer price to secure immediate execution. This urgency signal is analogous to the call sweep urgency described in Layer 1.
- **Speed of execution (sweep pattern):** When a series of transactions in rapid sequence (often within milliseconds) exhausts all available ask-side liquidity across multiple price levels, the pattern is consistent with an institutional market order sweeping through available liquidity. This is the equity-side analogue of the options call sweep described in Section 4.
- **Block cross patterns:** Large transactions that print at the midpoint of the NBBO, simultaneous with no change in the displayed book, are typically indicative of a dark pool or ATS print executing — the tape record of the dark pool activity described in Layer 2.
- **Hidden accumulation patterns:** A sustained pattern of medium-sized transactions (e.g., 300–800 lots) repeating with consistent timing and price response — where each print is followed by modest price appreciation before the next print appears — is consistent with an algorithmic institutional accumulation program systematically working a large order without revealing full size. This pattern is extremely valuable when identified early in the accumulation cycle.

Integration with Options Flow: The Convergence of Layers 1 and 3

The interpretive power of tape reading is maximized when it operates as a confirmation of the directional signal already generated by Layer 1 options flow analysis. When a Tier 1 call sweep has been identified in a specific equity, the practitioner's subsequent tape monitoring task is narrowly defined: does the equity tape confirm the bullish directional bias signaled by the options flow? Confirmation manifests as large-lot prints at the ask, aggressive sweeping, or a sustained hidden accumulation pattern. The convergence of a Tier 1 call sweep (Layer 1) with confirming bullish tape patterns (Layer 3) constitutes a twolayer confirmation that substantially elevates trade conviction. The addition of dark pool confirmation (Layer 2) and Anchored VWAP alignment (Layer 4) completes the four-layer signal architecture.

Layer 4 — Price-Action Confirmation via Anchored VWAP Anchored VWAP as the Price Structure Reference

The Volume-Weighted Average Price (VWAP) is the ratio of the cumulative dollar value of all transactions in a security to the cumulative share volume over a defined period. In its standard form, VWAP resets daily and is used primarily as an intraday execution benchmark by institutional traders — the central reference point against which institutional order execution quality is evaluated. The Anchored VWAP innovation, which is the subject of the author's companion paper ("Anchored VWAP as a Dynamic PriceAction Framework," SSRN, 2026), extends the VWAP concept by permitting the practitioner to anchor the VWAP calculation to any user-selected price-action event: an earnings announcement, a structural high or low, a regulatory event, or a sector catalyst.

The Anchored VWAP serves as Layer 4 of the institutional order flow framework because it provides the price structure context within which institutional order flow signals must be interpreted. Institutional participants — particularly large asset managers managing multi-billion-dollar portfolios — are acutely cost-basis conscious. Their buying programs are typically structured to accumulate shares at prices at or below their internal VWAP targets, and their selling programs are structured to achieve prices at or above their VWAP benchmarks. This institutional behavior makes Anchored VWAP levels — calculated from the same significant events that anchor institutional cost bases — highly reliable structural reference points for predicting where institutional buying (at Anchored VWAP support) and institutional selling (at Anchored VWAP resistance) will manifest.

The Integration Logic: Signal versus Structure

The conceptual architecture of the four-layer framework is organized around a fundamental distinction between signal and structure. Layers 1 through 3 generate directional signals — evidence of what institutional participants are doing (buying or selling) and with what urgency and size. Layer 4 provides the price structure context that determines whether those signals align with a favorable entry point. A Tier 1 call sweep is a powerful

signal. But if the underlying equity is trading at the upper band of its Anchored VWAP standard deviation envelope — far above institutional cost basis — the risk-reward of acting on that signal is materially different than if the equity is testing Anchored VWAP support at the same institutional cost-basis level.

Entry, Risk Management, and Anchored VWAP Standard Deviation Bands

The Anchored VWAP, when computed with standard deviation bands (analogous to Bollinger Bands but computed on volume-weighted price rather than simple moving average price), provides a natural risk management architecture. The practitioner enters a position when:

- All four layers confirm the directional hypothesis ($C \geq 0.70$);
- The current price is at or near the relevant Anchored VWAP level (± 0.25 standard deviation bands of the Anchored VWAP).

The stop-loss is placed at the first standard deviation band below the Anchored VWAP (for long positions), representing the level at which the institutional cost-basis thesis is invalidated. The initial profit target is set at the +1 standard deviation Anchored VWAP band, with subsequent targets at +2 standard deviation if the full four-layer signal alignment is present. This framework provides a systematic, structure based approach to trade management that avoids the ad hoc stop-loss and target placement that characterizes undisciplined retail trading practice.

The Integrated Four-Layer Framework: A Unified Methodology

Decision Architecture: From Scan to Signal to Execution

The integrated institutional order flow analytics framework operates as a hierarchical decision architecture with three sequential phases:

- Scan and watchlist generation
- Multi-layer signal confirmation
- Entry, sizing, and management

Each phase has defined criteria and decision rules, and advancement from one phase to the next is conditional on meeting threshold criteria in the preceding phase.

Table 3: Four-Layer Framework — Decision Architecture and Threshold Criteria

Phase	Primary Activity	Layer(s) Active	Advancement Criterion
Phase 1: Scan	Daily scan of options flow feeds for UOA and sweep	Layer 1 (primary),	At least one Tier 1 options signal OR 2.5x+ ATS volume spike with
Phase	Primary Activity	Layer(s) Active	Advancement Criterion
	activity; FINRA ATS weekly data review	Layer 2 (secondary)	corroborating options activity
Phase 2: Confirmation	Deep analysis of flagged securities across all four layers; IV surface review; tape monitoring; AVWAP structure analysis	Layers 1–4	Integrated conviction score $C \geq 0.70$; minimum two layers confirming same directional hypothesis
Phase 3: Execution	Entry at Anchored VWAP reference level; stop-loss at -1 SD band; target sizing based on framework conviction	Layer 4 (primary), Layers 1–3 for ongoing monitoring	All four layers confirming; price at or near AVWAP reference level; defined riskreward $\geq 2:1$

Weighting the Layers: Relative Signal Hierarchy

The four layers are not co-equal in their informational content or predictive power within the framework. Options flow (Layer 1) is designated the primary layer for three reasons:

- The academic evidence for its predictive validity is the most robust and consistent [6,7,14].
- Options flow provides the earliest signal of institutional directional intent, typically preceding equity price movement by the greatest lead time;
- Options flow carries embedded information about both the direction and the magnitude of the anticipated move (through strike selection) and the time horizon of the institutional thesis (through expiration selection).

Dark pool print analysis (Layer 2) occupies the secondary position because it provides the most direct evidence of large-scale equity accumulation or distribution by institutional participants — corroborating the directional hypothesis generated by options flow with equity market evidence. Tape reading (Layer 3) serves a timing and confirmation function: it provides the highest-frequency confirmation signal, allowing the practitioner to identify the precise moment when institutional buying or selling is actively occurring in real time, and to time entry accordingly. Anchored VWAP analysis (Layer 4) provides the structural context that governs entry, stop-loss, and target placement — the price architecture within which the trade is managed.

Framework Application Across Market Conditions

The integrated framework's application varies across different market regimes, and practitioners must calibrate their signal interpretation accordingly.

In trending markets (sustained directional price movement with orderly retracements), options flow signals are most reliable when they align with the prevailing trend direction. Counter-trend options flow (e.g., bullish call sweeps in a stock in a confirmed downtrend) should be treated as higher-risk signals, requiring stronger cross-layer confirmation before action.

In range-bound markets, open interest concentration at specific strike prices (the "max pain" mechanism described in Section 4) becomes particularly relevant. Institutional positioning tends to cluster around the strike with maximum open interest pain at expiration, and price action frequently oscillates between these levels in options expiration-driven cycles. Dark pool prints and tape patterns near range boundaries provide the most actionable signals in this environment.

In high-volatility environments (VIX elevated, broad market uncertainty), options flow interpretation requires adjustment for the elevated baseline of options activity. UOA thresholds should be recalibrated upward to account for generally elevated options volume. IV skew analysis becomes more complex as broad market skew (tail-risk hedging) can overwhelm single-stock IV signals. Dark pool data remains valuable but should be interpreted cautiously given the elevated likelihood of risk-management-driven (rather than directionally-motivated) institutional trading.

Implications for Financial Education and Retail Investor Protection

The Educational Significance of Institutional Order Flow Analytics

The most significant long-term contribution of the institutional order flow analytics framework may lie not in its immediate application to trading, but in its educational significance for retail market participants. The structural information asymmetry between institutional and retail participants — documented across decades of market microstructure research — has been widely framed as an immutable feature of capital markets: sophisticated institutional participants will always possess superior information about their own activity, and retail participants must accept the consequences of trading against informationally superior counterparties. The framework developed in this paper challenges the inevitability of this asymmetry.

Retail participants who master the interpretive skills required to decode institutional order flow signals — through systematic training in options flow analytics, dark pool print interpretation, tape reading, and Anchored VWAP analysis — can meaningfully approximate the directional positioning information available to institutional participants through their own order flow intelligence. This "informational democratization" is not absolute; institutional participants retain structural advantages in execution speed, data granularity, and capital scale that cannot be fully bridged. But the directional signal — the answer to the question "what are the large, informed participants doing right now?" — is substantially more accessible to trained retail practitioners today than at any prior point in market history.

Blue Crest Capital's Role in Disseminating the Framework

Blue Crest Capital Investment Consulting (Plain City, Ohio), founded and led by the author, has developed a comprehensive curriculum for retail and professional traders based on the four-layer institutional order flow analytics framework presented in this paper. The curriculum includes:

- Structured online coursework covering each of the four analytical layers in depth, with practical exercises using real market data.
- The proprietary US Market Insights Report — a regular practitioner publication applying the four-layer framework to current market conditions, sector rotations, and specific equity opportunities.
- Live training sessions and webinars in which the framework is applied to real-time market conditions, providing students with the experiential context that formal coursework alone cannot replicate.

The pedagogical philosophy underlying Blue Crest Capital's educational mission is that institutional-grade market analysis skills — historically accessible only to those fortunate enough to work within major financial institutions — can and should be systematically transferable to retail market participants who invest the time and effort required to develop them. The author's 19+ years of institutional experience across Citigroup, HSBC Global Banking and Markets, Northern Trust, and Sapient (Publicis Sapient) provides the practitioner foundation from which this curriculum is constructed — bridging the gap between institutional practice and retail education that most financial

education programs, which are typically built by academics without institutional trading experience, cannot effectively span.

Regulatory Context: SEC Regulation NMS and FINRA ATS Transparency

The institutional order flow analytics framework is made possible, in significant part, by the regulatory infrastructure that governs U.S. equity market transparency. SEC Regulation NMS (2005), while primarily designed to promote competition among trading venues and protect order execution quality, created the data architecture — including the OPRA consolidated options tape and the consolidated equity tape — that enables the kind of cross-venue options and equity flow analysis described in this paper. FINRA's ATS Transparency initiative, which began publishing weekly ATS volume data in 2014, represents a deliberate regulatory effort to increase the transparency of dark pool trading — a venue previously characterized by near-total opacity for non-participants.

The regulatory transparency infrastructure that enables this framework is, however, incomplete and subject to meaningful limitations. Options flow data, while publicly available through OPRA, is not currently provided in a form that readily identifies institutional from retail participation, requiring practitioner judgment to distinguish signal from noise. FINRA ATS data is reported with a one-week lag, limiting its real-time utility. And a substantial fraction of off-exchange trading — through payment for order flow internalizes — is reported in aggregate without security-level granularity comparable to ATS data.

Recommendations for Further Regulatory Transparency

Based on the practitioner experience underlying this framework, the author offers the following recommendations for regulatory enhancements that would further reduce informational asymmetries in U.S. equity markets:

- **Shortened ATS reporting lag:** Reducing the FINRA ATS data reporting lag from one week to one day (or real-time, subject to appropriate market impact protections) would substantially increase the utility of dark pool volume data for practitioner and researcher applications.
- **Security-level internalize volume reporting:** Extending the FINRA ATS Transparency Data framework to include security-level volume data for payment-for order-flow internalizes — currently reported only in aggregate — would provide a more complete picture of off-exchange institutional and institutional-adjacent activity.
- **Consolidated options flow standards:** The development of a standardized, consolidated options flow reporting format — analogous to the OPRA consolidated tape but with enhanced participant-type tagging (institutional vs. retail, opening vs. closing, directional vs. hedging) — would materially improve the signal-to-noise ratio of options flow analytics for the broader practitioner community.

Conclusion

This paper has presented a comprehensive, practitioner-grounded framework for institutional order flow analytics in U.S. equity and options markets. The four-layer architecture — Options Flow Analytics (Layer 1), Dark Pool Print Analysis (Layer 2), Level 2 Order Book and Tape Reading (Layer 3), and Anchored VWAP

Price-Action Confirmation (Layer 4) — provides a systematic methodology for identifying, interpreting, and acting on the institutional order flow signals that are systematically embedded in publicly available market data. The framework integrates the theoretical insights of market microstructure research — Kyle's informed trading model, Glosten and Milgrom's adverse selection framework, the empirical findings of Pan and Poteshman and Cao, Chen, and Griffin on options market informational content, and the VPIN framework of Easley, López de Prado, and O'Hara — with 19+ years of institutional trading experience across Citigroup, HSBC Global Banking and Markets, Northern Trust, and Sapient (Publicis Sapient) [1,2,6-8].

The framework's primary contribution to the existing literature is the synthesis of four independently documented but previously unintegrated data streams into a unified, operationally actionable institutional order flow analytics system. No existing academic or practitioner publication provides a comparable integrated framework — the gap that this paper addresses is genuine, and the demand for such a framework, evidenced by the growing retail practitioner interest in institutional order flow tools, is substantial and growing.

Three directions for future empirical research are particularly promising and are recommended as priorities for the academic market microstructure community. First, systematic back testing of Tier 1 options sweep signals — as defined by the classification system presented in Section 4 — against subsequent 5-day, 10-day, and 30-day equity returns, using commercially available options flow data spanning 2010–2025. Second, a quantitative assessment of the incremental predictive power of dark pool print signals (as defined in Section 5) in a multivariate regression framework that controls for the informational content of options flow, equity order imbalance, and standard risk factors. Third, the development of a multi-factor Institutional Flow Score (IFS) — a composite metric that formalizes the four-layer conviction score described in Section 8 into a single numerical indicator suitable for systematic back testing and portfolio construction applications. Each of these research directions would contribute materially to the empirical validation of the framework presented here, and to the broader project of reducing the information asymmetries that continue to characterize U.S. equity markets [17-25].

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